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15 February 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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15 February 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

2. USSR - Communist China: Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance anniversary celebrations on 14 February most perfunctory in history. (Page *ii*)

25X1

4. Netherlands - West New Guinea: The Hague considering "very sizable" troop reinforcements for West New Guinea. (Page *iii*)

25X1

7. Turkey: Arrests of Menderes regime cabinet ministers may increase dissension in Inonu government. (Page *iv*)

8. Cuba: Veteran Communist assumes leading role in National Agrarian Reform Institute. (Page *v*)

9. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page *vi*)

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 February 1962

DAILY BRIEF

25X1

i

25X1

Sino-Soviet Treaty Anniversary: Activities in the USSR and China celebrating the 12th anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance--on 14 February--were the most perfunctory in the treaty's history. In Peiping, only Foreign Minister Chen Yi, among leading regime officials, attended the annual anniversary eve rally. Last year Premier Chou En-lai and politburo member Peng Chen were also present. In Moscow, the annual reception by the Chinese ambassador--which Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Suslov attended last year--was replaced by a friendship meeting at which the leading Soviet representative was presidium member Voronov.

The Chinese used the occasion to imply that Khrushchev rather than Mao is responsible for weakening the alliance. The Soviet ambassador in Peiping denied this and hinted that the USSR would protect only "friendly" Socialist countries from attack, a point which Moscow has made recently on two other occasions. This reminder of China's relative military weakness reverses Soviet statements of support made last year, particularly Suslov's pledge--using Khrushchev's words of 1958--that the USSR will consider "an attack on China as an attack on the Soviet Union." Soviet statements reflect Khrushchev's determination to retain maximum flexibility in implementing his policy of peaceful coexistence.

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


15 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

ii

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Netherlands - West New Guinea: Foreign Minister Luns informed the British ambassador on 12 February that the Netherlands is considering sending "very sizable" troop reinforcements to West New Guinea, but that a final decision has not been made. Luns also said the Dutch were disappointed with the US refusal to permit passage of chartered aircraft to New Guinea and resented being pressured by the US and others on the New Guinea issue. The US Embassy in The Hague comments that it has no indication that the Dutch are planning to reinforce their approximately 5,000 troops in the area. Luns probably assumed his remarks would reach the US and the other NATO allies and serve to impress upon them the Netherlands' stiffened attitude. Dispatching troops at this time would be regarded as provocative by Indonesia, and it would also divide Dutch opinion, which remains hopeful that the two sides can agree to terms of negotiations and lead to peaceful settlement of the dispute. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

15 Feb 62



DAILY BRIEF

iii

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
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Turkey: Arrests of three former members of the cabinet of executed Premier Menderes, one of whom is now an official of the Justice party, are likely to increase dissension in Inonu's coalition government. The three former ministers are reportedly accused of misusing their authority during their tenures

15 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1



of office--they lost their cabinet posts after the election of 1957--and were not among the almost 600 officials of the Menderes regime who were tried last year following the military coup. These arrests would seem to be out of line with Inonu's recent efforts to reduce antagonism between the pro-Menderes Justice party on the one hand, and the Republican People's party and the military on the other. [redacted]

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*Cuba: A Havana radio station announced on 14 February the appointment of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez as "president of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA)." The broadcast added that Rodriguez, who is a veteran leader of the Cuban Communists' Popular Socialist party, will continue his functions as director of the Communist party daily newspaper. The presidency of INRA has been largely an honorary title which was conferred on Fidel Castro upon the formation of INRA in mid-1959. Real administrative control has been exercised by the executive secretary, Antonio Nunez Jimenez, whose influence has been declining. He is known recently to have stated his intention to transfer to another job. It may be that Rodriguez is replacing Nunez Jimenez as executive secretary. Even if Castro is replaced as president of INRA, this would not by itself mean any diminution of his position.

INRA within six months of its formation rapidly mushroomed into many fields alien to agrarian matters, and it became the primary instrument of the state in gaining control of the Cuban economy. In April 1961, however, its nonagrarian functions were transferred to several new ministries, and it is now restricted largely to implementing the government's agrarian reform program. INRA's control of Cuba's industrial complex, for instance, was transferred to a new Ministry of Industries, headed by Che Guevara. [redacted]

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NOTE

[In the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 14 February, the last sentence of the Venezuelan backup article, page two, should read: "...the \$3.6 billion US private investment...."] [redacted]

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15 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

25X1

[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:]

[No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.]

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LAOS: [Current indications do not point to an all-out Communist offensive. The available evidence indicates that the Communists will continue their limited military pressures on Phoumi toward formation of a coalition government on Communist terms.]

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25X1

SOUTH VIETNAM: [The pattern of Viet Cong subversive and small-scale military activity remains unchanged.]

15 Feb 62

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1

25X1

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